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Identifying Class Members in Stockholder Class Actions: Oppenheimer Fund, Inc.
v. Sanders'—Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. (Fund) is an open-ended, diversified
investment fund which sells shares to the public at a price representing the
net asset value of the shares plus a sales charge. 2
 Oppenheimer Management
Corporation (Management Corporation) manages the Fund's investment
portfolio. 3
 Eighty-two percent of the stock of Management Corporation, in-
cluding all of its voting stock, is owned by the brokerage firm of Op-
penheimer and Co. (Brokerage Firm). 4
 Sanders and other plaintiffs who had
purchased shares in the fund during 1968 and 1969 filed complaints in 1969
alleging that Management Corporation and Brokerage Firm had violated fed-
eral securities laws.' They contended that Management Corporation and
Brokerage Firm failed to disclose that the Fund invested in restricted se-
curities,6
 the potential risks of such investments, and the methods used to
value the restricted securities.' In addition, Sanders and the other plaintiffs
alleged that the restricted securities were overvalued on the Fund's books, and
that the overvaluation artificially inflated the price of shares in the Fund. 9
Sanders and the other plaintiffs sought damages from Brokerage Firm and
Management Corporation on behalf of shareholders who paid excessive prices
for their shares. 9
Plaintiffs moved for an order allowing them to represent a class of per-
sons who had purchased shares in the Fund between March 28, 1968, and
April 24, 1970.'" Depositions of the Fund's transfer agent revealed that the
437 U.S. 340 (1978).
2
 The Fund is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976). 437 U.S. at 342.
" 437 U.S. at 342. The Fund pays Management Corporation a fee, which is
computed as a percentage of the Fund's net asset value, in accordance with an invest-
ment advisory agreement. Id. al 342-43.
4 Id. at 343. The individual defendants were directors or officers of the Fund
or Management Corporation, or partners in Brokerage Firm. Id.
Id. Plaintiffs originally filed three complaints on March 26, May 12, and
June 18, 1969, but later consolidated them. Id. The complaints alleged violations of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1976), the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1976), the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-1 a seq. (1976), and rules promulgated under these Acts. 437 U.S. at 343 n.l.
" The Securities Exchange Commission defines "restricted securities" as "se-
curities acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer thereof, or from an affiliate of
such issuer, in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public offer-
ing ...." 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (1977). The Court in Oppenheimer noted that "[t]he
public sale or distribution of such securities is restricted under the Securities Act of
1933 until the securities are registered or an exemption from registration becomes




 Id. at 343-44. Plaintiff's counsel estimated that the aggregate recovery
might be $1,500,000; each class member would recover about $15. Id. at 344 n.3.
'" Id. at 344. The motion was made pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Id.
Rule 23(b)(3) states that an action may he maintained as a class action if:
(3) the court finds that the question of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominates over any questions affecting only indi-
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proposed class consisted of approximately 121,000 former and present
shareholders." From the transfer agent's testimony, it was estimated that the
cost of obtaining the names and addresses of these 121,000 class members
from the computer files of the transfer agent would exceed $16,000. 12 Learn-
ing this, plaintiffs moved to redefine the class to include only the 103,000
people who still held shares in the Fund and who had purchased them be-
tween March 28, 1968, and April 24, 1970." This redefinition would have
reduced the expense necessary to compile a list of class members since all
present shareholders were already on a regular mailing list."
More than six years after the litigation began, the district court rejected
plaintiffs' motion for redefinition of the class." The district court reasoned
that the proposed redefinition constituted an arbitrary reduction of the class
since the inflated price of shares in the Fund had harmed shareholders who
later sold their shares as much as those who retained their shares." The
district court held, however, that the cost of compiling the list of class mem-
bers was the responsibility of the defendants, not the plaintiffs.' 7 The district
court based its conclusion on two grounds: first, that. the expense of compiling
the list was "relatively modest"; and second, that it was the defendants who
sought to have the class defined in a manlier requiring the expense."
The defendants appealed the district court ruling. A divided panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the order
requiring the defendants to hear the expense of compiling the list of class
members and their addresses.'" The panel based its decision on Eisen. v. Car-
victual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (El) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy already commenced by' or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
I 1 437 U.S. at. 344-45.
12 Id. at 345. To compile a list. of' the class members' names and addresses, a
large volume of paper records had to be sorted manually, between.150,000 and
300,000 computer cards had to he key punched, and eight new computer programs
had to be created. Id.
hte
14 Id. Plaintiffs also asked the court to allow it to insert a class notice in one of
the Fund's periodic mailings to current shareholders. The plaintiffs proposed to pay
the $5,000 expense of printing and inserting the notices in the Fund's periodic mail-
ing. Use of the Fund's periodic mailing would have saved plaintiffs the additional
expense of a separate mailing of the class notice. Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 647
(2c1 Cir. 1976).
'' Sanders v. Levy. 20 Fed. R. Set -v. 2d 1218, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
' T Id.
Id.
1 " Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 643 (2d Cir. 1976).
March 1979]	 CASENOTES	 619
lisle & Jacquelin 2" (Eisen IV), 21
 where the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
in a class action must pay the cost of notifying class members of the suit. 22
The panel reasoned that since identification of class members is an integral
step in the process of notification, the Eisen IV decision also requires plaintiffs
to bear the cost of identification. 23
On rehearing en banc, however, the Second Circuit reversed the panel's
decision, 24 holding that the names and addresses of class members are within
the scope of discovery. The court noted that, under rule 26(b)(I), "any matter
... which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action" is
discoverable. 25 Since the adequacy of plaintiffs' notice to class members
might arise as an issue in the ensuing litigation, 26 the court concluded that
any matter relating to this issue—including identification of class
members—was discoverable. In addition, the court stated that rule 34 was the
proper discovery rule for obtaining the class members' names and addresses
in this case, since rule 34 applies specifically to the discovery of computerized
information. 27 Turning to the issue of which party should bear the expense of
2" 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
21
 There were four appellate court decisions in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin:
Eisen I, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035; Eisen II, 391 F. 2d 555
(2d Cir. 1968); Eisen III, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973); and Eisen IV, 417 U.S. 156
(1974). For a complete chronology of all district and appellate court decisions of Eisen,
see In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litigation, 574 F.2d (162, 664 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978).
22 417 U.S. at 178-79.
2:1
 Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1976). The court found that
plaintiff's should bear the cost in the absence of special circumstances, such as a rela-
tionship between the parties which is not truly adversary. Id. at 639-40.
24 Id. at 646.
25 Id. FED, R Cm P. 26(b)(1) provides:
(h) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court
in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pend-
ing action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seek-
ing discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of
any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is
not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmis-
sible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
2 " Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 648 (2d Cir. 1976).
27 id FED. R. Civ. P. 34 provides in relevant part:
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to
produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on
his behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents (including writ-
ings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, and other data
compilations from which information can be obtained. translated, if neces-
sary, by the respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable
form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things which
constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are
in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is
served ....
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discovery, the court stated that, Eisen IV was not controlling. The court
reasoned that in Eisen IV there was no statutory authority for allocating the
cost of notifying class members to defendants. By contrast, the court of ap-
peals concluded, rule 34 provides statutory authority for a court to allocate
the cost of identifying class members to defendants." Moreover, the court
concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion under rule
26(0, 29 which protects parties from undue expense in complying with discov-
ery requests, when it refused to relieve defendants of the expense of compil-
ing the list of class members. 3 "
The Supreme Court grained certiorari, 3 ' and, in a unanimous decision
written by Justice Powell, reversed the en Banc decision of the Second Circuit.
The Court HELD: Rule 23(d), 32 which authorizes courts to make certain or-
ders necessary to the conduct of a class action, is the appropriate source of
authority for a court to order the defendant in a class action to compile a list
of the members of the plaintiff class." The Court thus rejected the Second
Circuit's conclusion that the discovery rules are the appropriate source of au-
thority for such orders, reasoning that the names and addresses of class
members are not within the scope of discovery as set forth in rule 26(b)(1). 34
The Court held that an order requiring a class action defendant to compile a
list of the class members' names and addresses is appropriate only if the task
can be performed more efficiently by the defendant." Furthermore, the Op-
penheimer Court indicated that, with few exceptions, courts should place the
cost of compiling a list of class members on the representative plaintiff, rather
than on the defendant. 3" Turning to the case before it, the Court concluded
that the district court had abused its discretion by requiring the defendants to
bear the cost of compiling the list of class members."
Oppenheimer is significant because the Court made clear for the first time
that a district court's power to order one party to provide the names and
28 558 F.2d at 648.
" FED. R. Ctv. P. 26 (C).
38 558 F.2d at 650.
31 434 U.S. 919 (1977). The Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict be-
tween the Second Circuit and the Fifth Circuit. Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. 340. 348-49. The
Fifth Circuit held, in in re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088,
1102 (5th Cir. 1977), that a court could order a party to provide the names and ad-
dresses of members of a plaintiff class only through rule 23(d).
33
 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) states in relevant part that a court in the conduct of
class actions, may make appropriate orders
(2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or other-
wise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice he given in such manner
as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the
action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of
members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to
come into the action; ... (5) dealing with similar procedural matters.
33
 437 U.S. at 355. •
3 '1
 Id. at 354.
35 Id. at 356-57.
36 Id. at 358.
37
 Id. at 359.
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addresses of class members stems from rule 23. The Court also delineated the
discretion a trial court may exercise in allocating the costs of identifying
members of a plaintiff class: The Court's admonition that courts should gen-
erally assign these expenses to the plaintiff inevitably will increase the burden
on plaintiffs bringing stockholder class actions since they will now have to
bear not only the cost of actual notification of class members, but also the cost.
of their identification.
This casenote will first analyze the rationale for the Court's decision in
Oppenheimer. Next, Oppenheimer's impact on stockholder class actions will be
considered in light of the policies which motivated Congress to enact rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Securities Acts. 38
 Finally, this
casenote will examine two strategies for minimizing the impact of Oppenheimer
on stockholder class actions.
I. THE OPPENHEIMER DECISION
In reaching its decision to place the expense of compiling the list of class
members and their addresses on the plaintiffs rather than on the defendants
in Oppenheimer, the Court first focused on whether the information which the
plaintiffs sought. was "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action,"" and thus within the scope of discovery as set forth in rule 26(b)(I)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'" The Court rejected the Second
Circuit's opinion that since the adequacy of notice to class members might
arise as a "potential issue" in litigation, the names and addresses of members
of the plaintiff class were within the scope of discovery. 4 ' The Court noted
that the plaintiffs had argued in the district court that they desired the list of
class members for only one purpose: to enable them to send the required
class notice." The Court stated that Sanders never pretended to be anticipat-
i ► g that the list of class members and their addresses would prove helpful in
resolving the "potential issue" of whether adequate notice had been sent. 43 In
addition, the Court noted that until plaintiffs received the information and
sent the class notice, no issue could arise as to whether it had been sent prop-
" The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1976); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1976).
3" 437 U.S. at 350-51.
4" Id. See note 25 supra. The Court refused to rely on any distinction between
the Fund and the other defendants. There was a distinction, however, because the
Fund had not been named as a defendant in the class action portion of the suit. 437
U.S. at 347 ti.9. The Court stated:
ITIhe Fund itself, which is in the position of a defendant because it ulti-
mately may he liable for any damages that respondents and their class re-
cover ... does not argue in this Court that it should not bear the expense
because it is not a formal defendant. We therefore do not rely on any
distinction that might he drawn between the Fund and the other petition-
ers in this respect,
Id.
4 ' M. at 354.
4" Id. at 353.
43 Id. at 354.
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erly. 44
 On this basis, the Court concluded that the discovery rules were not
the proper tool for acquiring the list of class members in this instance."
The proper source of authority for obtaining the names and addresses of
class members, according to the Court., is rule 23(d). 4 " The Court pointed
out that under rule 23(d) a district court can order a defendant in a class
action to perform tasks that are necessary for the sending of notice. 47 Reason-
ing that identification of class members is merely another task that must be
performed as part of the notification process, the Oppenheimer Court deter-
mined that rule 23(d) allows a district court to require a defendant's coopera-
tion. The Court decided that it would be appropriate for a district court to
order a defendant to identify the class members when the defendant can per-
form the task with less difficulty or expense than the plaintiff. 48 In the in-
stant case, since the Fund controlled the records kept by its transfer agent,
and since the class members could be identified only by reference to these
records, the Court concluded that the district. court acted within its authority
under rule 23(d) in ordering the Fund to make the records available to the
plaintiffs."
The Court then considered the issue of which party should bear the ex-
pense of identifying class members in situations where it is appropriate to
order the defendant's cooperation in the identification process. The Court
stated that although a district court has discretion to allocate to either party
the expense of identification of class members, there are limits to this discre-
tion. 5 " The Court asserted that. Eisen IV strongly suggests that the plaintiff,
who in most circumstances benefits from having the class identified," should
bear the expense of performing the task of identification." The Court
explained that a district court should require the defendant to hear the ex-
pense only in situations where the task of identification is one which the de-
fendant performs during the ordinary course of his business, or where the
expense is insubstantial."
44 Id.
45 Id. The Court noted, however, that it was not implying that a plaintiff could
never obtain class members' names and addresses under the discovery rules. The
Court stated that the discovery rules may apply when the identity of class members is
relevant to issues that arise under rule 23, such as common questions, numerosity, and
adequacy of representation. Id. at 354 n.20. The Court doubted, however, that any of
these issues would require compilation of the names and addresses of all members of a
large class. Id.
'" Id. at 354. For the text of rule 23(d), see note 32 supra. The court thus
agreed with the decision in In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d
1088, 1102 (5th Cir. 1977), where the Fifth Circuit held that rule 23(d) was the proper
source of authority for obtaining the identity and addresses of class members.
47 437 U.S. at 354.
48 Id. at 356.
'" hi. at 359.
Id. at 358.
51 hi. The Court noted that the benefits of res judicata which accrue to
defendants in class actions do not justify forcing an unwilling defendant to bear the
expense of notice, ld. at 361 n.30.
" Id. at 359.
53 Id.
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Turning to the case at hand, the Court examined the district court's
reasons for requiring the defendant to bear the expense of compiling the class
list in light of this new standard of discretion under rule 23. The district court
had reasoned that the Fund should bear the expense because it opposed the
redefinition of the plaintiff class which would have avoided the expense of
compiling the class list." The Supreme Court, however, found this to be an
unreasonable justification, noting that. it is "neither fair nor good policy to
penalize a defendant for prevailing in an argument." 5s
 The district court
also had reasoned that the Fund should bear the cost of identifying class
members because the expense of $16,000 was a "relatively modest" sum in
comparison to the Fund's total assets of over $500,000,000. 5 " The Supreme
Court rejected this rationale as well. It stated that the test under rule 23 for
determining if an expense should be shifted to the plaintiff is whether the
cost is substantial, not whether the expense is an undue burden." Since the
Court viewed $16,000 as far from insubstantial, it determined that the cost
should have been shifted to the plaintiffs. 58 Thus, the Court concluded that
the district court ran afoul of the principle of Eisen IV when it required the
defendants to bear the cost of compiling the class list."
II. OPPENHEIMER'S IMPACT ON STOCKHOLDER ['.LASS ACTIONS
Prior to Oppenheimer, the issue of who should bear the expense of iden-
tifying members of a plaintiff class was unresolved. Most courts placed the
expense on the party, usually the defendant., who possessed the records from
which a list of class members could be compiled." By requiring a plaintiff
54 Sanders v. Levy, 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2c1 1218, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" 437 U.S. at 360.
5" Sanders v. Levy, 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1218, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
57 437 U.S. at 361-62.
58 Id. at 362.
59 Id. at 359. In the final part of its opinion, the Court considered and rejected
plaintiff's contention that the defendants should bear the expense of identification
because they breached their fiduciary duty to the plaintiff class. Id. at 363. The Court
stated that a "bare allegation of wrongdoing" does not justify requiring a defendant to
assume the financial burden of furthering a plaintiff's case. Id. The Court. added that.
it would not benefit the class of persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed to require
them to help finance all class suits brought by one of their class alleging a breach of
fiduciary duty. Id.
''" Some courts have characterized the identity of the class members as discov-
erable information and required the possessor of the information, nonparties or de-
fendants, to compile a list and hear the expense. See In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec.
Litigation, 574 F.2d 662, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1978) (court held that stockholders' names
held by nonparty brokerage firms were discoverable by use of a subpoena duces tecum
and that the expense of responding fell on the responding party); Blank v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 54 F.R.D. 627, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (court refused to shift the cost of
identifying class members from nonparty brokerage firms to the plaintiff); Chevalier v.
Baird Say. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (court held that class members'
names and addresses in the defendants' possession were discoverable pursuant. to FED.
R. CD/. P. 34 and 26(b) and that the expense of compiling the list fell on the defend-
ants). Other courts have placed the expense of identifying class members on defend-
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bringing a stockholder class action to bear the expense of identifying the
plaintiff class, the Court in Oppenheimer has increased significantly the finan-
cial burden that a representative plaintiff must bear. Thus, Oppenheimer will
seriously hinder the usefulness of class actions for stockholders seeking dam-
ages.
The increased financial burden on stockholder plaintiffs in class actions
involving alleged violations of federal securities laws conflicts with the primary
purposes of the Securities Acts"' and rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The legislative history of the Securities Act of 1933 indicates that
one of the primary purposes of the Act is to protect investors against fraud.
The report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency stated that
"the purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest busi-
ness." "2
 Congress saw the imposition of civil liability as an important element
of the protection provided for investors." 3
Stockholder class actions are frequently the vehicle for imposing civil lia-
bility on offenders of the securities laws."' Professor Kaplan, Reporter of the
ants who possessed the information without citing specific statutory authority for their
action. See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Lamb. v. United
Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 43 (S.D. Iowa 1972). In contrast, a few courts have
placed the expense of identifying members of the plaintiff class on the representative
plaintiff. These courts have relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 23 and on Eisen IV, 417 U.S. 156
(1974). See In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1(188, 1102 (5th
Cir. 1977); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 73 F.R.D, 322, 359-60 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
"` The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a el seq. (1976); the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. (1976). While § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 el seq. (1976), does not by its terms provide an
express civil remedy and the legislative history is inconclusive, the Supreme Court has
found that private enforcement may "[provide} a necessary supplement to commission
action." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-30 (1975) (quoting
J.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). Senator Fletcher presented
the report from the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency. See also H.R. REP.
No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (the President, in his message to Congress, stated: "This
is but one step in our broad purpose of protecting investors and depositors.").
"3
 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). Mr. Rayburn of the Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce submitted the report. He stated, "Instead
of impeding honest business, the imposition of [civil] liabilities of this character carries
over into the general field of security selling, ethical standards of honesty and fair
dealing common to every fiduciary undertaking." Id.
" 4 See Patrick, The Securities Class Action Jri Damages Comes of Age (1966-1971),
29 Bus. LAW. 159, 159 (March 1974) ("During the past eight. years, class actions have
become increasingly numerous and increasingly important as a practical remedy and
an effective deterrent for violations of federal securities laws."); Ford, Federal Rule 23:
A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. & Coy. L. REV. 501, 501 (1969) ("In
the brief period since its amendment., effective July I, 1966. Federal Rule 23 has
dramatically altered the nature and scope of private litigation in this country, and it
portends further widespread changes. To date these changes arc most. noticeable in
the securities and antitrust fields."); Bernstein, Class Actions in the Securities Field, 9
TRIAL LAW. Q. 23, 24 (1973) ("[F]ederal statutory remedies for recovery of damages
for security fraud have existed for over forty years. Why then is it only in the last few
years that massive securities litigation has burgeoned? The reason is that up until the
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Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, stated that the
major purpose of rule 23, which governs class actions, is "to provide means of
vindicating the rights of groups of people who individually would be without
effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all." 65
 Since a small,
individual investor's damages generally are insufficient to justify "bringing his
opponents into court," it is only natural that small investors have turned to
the class action as an avenue for seeking relief. By requiring aggrieved
stockholders to bear the expense of identifying members of the plaintiff class
as well as sending notice to them, however, Oppenheimer seriously hinders the
usefulness of class actions for stockholder suits and thus conflicts with the
purpose for which rule 23 was enacted and the purpose for imposing civil
liability under the Securities Acts.
III. METHODS OF AVOIDING THE HARSH
EFFECTS OF OPPENHEIMER
There are at least two possible methods that a plaintiff in a stockholder
class action can use to avoid the harsh effects of Oppenheimer. First, a plaintiff
can characterize his request for the identity of the class members as a request
for information relevant to issues arising under rule 23. Second, a plaintiff
can divide the class into subclasses to decrease the number of members of the
class and thereby decrease the expense of identification.
The first method involves classifying the request for the names and ad-
dresses of the members of the plaintiff class as a request for information
within the scope of the discovery rules. Although the Court in Oppenheimer
held that the identity of class members was not discoverable information in
that case, the Court did not hold that the identity of class members is never
discoverable. Indeed, the Court noted that the identity of class members often
bears upon issues that a district court must consider when deciding whether a
suit should proceed as a class action: whether the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impractical, whether there are questions of law and
fact common to the class, and whether the class will be adequately represented
by the named plaintiff." The Court also noted that the identity of class
amendment of the federal class action rule (F.R.C.P. Rule 23) in 1966, the victimized
shareholder could only sue effectively for himself."); Note, 23 KAN. L. REV. 309, 317
(1975) ("One of the most efficacious uses of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions is to remedy
violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.")
"5 Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INn. & Com. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969).
"" 437 U.S. at 351 n.13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Annot., Discovery for Purposes of
Determining Whether Class Action Requirements Under Rule 23(a) and (b) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Are Satisfied, 24 A.L.R. Fed. 872 (1975).
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the pre-
requisites for a class action, states:
(a) Prerequisites to Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
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members is within the scope of discovery if there is reason to believe that
some members of the class could supply information bearing on other issues
relevant to the matter being litigated." 1
 However, the Court added, "it may
be doubted whether any of these purposes would require compilation of the
names and addresses of all members of a large class."" This suggestion is
dicta, though, and other courts that have directly confronted the question
have allowed discovery of the entire plaintiff class." Thus, the identity of
class members may fall within the scope of discovery even after Oppenheimer.
If the information sought is within the scope of discovery, a plaintiff may
be able to avoid the expense of compiling a list of members of the plaintiff
class since the presumption is that the responding party bears the expense of
complying with discovery requests. 7" The final determination of who bears
the expense of discovery, however, depends largely on which of the two po-
tentially applicable discovery rules applies: rule 34, 71
 dealing with the produc-
tion of documents; or rule 33, 72
 dealing with the production of business rec-
ords. Which of these rules applies to the discovery of the identities of class
members is crucial because the two rules differ in assigning the expenses aris-
ing from discovery. 73
 If rule 33 applies, the plaintiff must bear the expense
of compiling the information since rule 33(c) requires a responding party
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class.
67 437 U.S. at 351 n.13.
68 Id. at 354 n.20.
" See Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (court allowed
discovery of the identity of class members to determine the issue of numerosity);
Burnstein v. Slote, 12 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 577, 579-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (court allowed
discovery of the names of security holders of the defendant corporation in order to
determine whether the class was so numerous as to make joinder of all members im-
practicable). See also Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 54 F.R.D. 627, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(court allowed discovery of the names and last known addresses of the stock holders of
General Time). See generally Annot., Discovery for Purposes of Determining Whether Class
Action Requirements under Rule 23(a) & (b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Are Satisfied,
24 A.L.R. Fed. 872 (1975).
" 437 U.S. at 358. The Oppenheimer Court noted, however, that the respond-
ing party "may invoke the District Court's discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders
protecting him from 'undue burden or expense'...."
71 See note 27 supra.
72
 FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c) states:
(c) Option to Produce Business Records. Where the answer to an in-
terrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the business records of the
party upon whom the interrogatory has been served or from an examina-
tion, audit or inspection of such business records, or from a compilation,
abstract or summary based thereon, and the burden of deriving or ascer-
taining the answer is substantially the same for the party serving the inter-
rogatory as for the party served, it is a sufficient answer to such inter-
rogatory to specify the records from which the answer may be derived or
ascertained and to afford to the party serving the interrogatory reasonable
opportunity to examine, audit or inspect such records and to make copies,
compilations, abstracts or summaries.
73 See 66 CALIF. L. REV. 105, 112-15 (1978); 91 HARV. L. REV. 703, 709-11
(1978).
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merely to make its records available to discovering parties, rather than to
compile the information in those records, where the burden of researching
them is substantially the same for both parties. 74 Rule 33 does not require
the discovering party to bear the expense, however, if the burden of research-
ing the records is greater for the discovering party and not unduly burden-
some for the responding party.Th In a situation like that in Oppenheimer,
where the relevant records are stored in computer files, the expense of com-
piling the information is the same for both the plaintiff and the defendant.
Thus, in such a situation, rule 33(c) places on the plaintiff the expense of
compiling the list of class members.
In contrast, if rule 34 applies to a plaintiff's request for discovery of the
names and addresses of class members, a district court could place the ex-
pense of compiling the information on the defendant, unless the cost is exces-
sive.'" In determining whether the cost is excessive, a district court can con-
sider such factors as the relative ability of the parties to bear the financial
burden. 77
 Perhaps the clearest discussion of this point is in the Second Cir-
74 For the text of rule 33(c), see note 72 supra. See Advisory Committee Note
to rule 33, 48 F.R.D. 522, 524-25 (1970). The Committee stated:
[33c1 is a new subdivision, adapted from Calif. Code Civ. Proc. § 2030(c),
relating especially to interrogatories which require a party to engage in
burdensome or expensive research into his own business records in order
to give an answer. The subdivision gives the party an option to make the
records available and place the burden of research on the party who seeks
the information. This provision, without undermining the liberal scope of
interrogatory discovery, places the burden of discovery upon its potential
benefitee, - Louise11, Modern California Discovery, 124-125 (1963), and al-
leviates a problem which in the past has troubled Federal courts. See
Speck, The Use of Discovery in United Slates District Courts, 60 Yale L.J. 1132,
1142-1144 (1951). The interrogating party is protected against abusive use
of this provision through the requirement that the burden of ascertaining
the answer be substantially the same for both sides. A respondent may not
impose on an interrogating party a mass of records as to which research is
feasible only for one familiar with the records. At the same time, the re-
spondent unable to invoke this subdivision does not on that account lose
the protection available to hint under new Rule 26(c) against oppressive or
unduly burdensome or expensive interrogatories. And even when the re-
spondent. successfully invokes the subdivision, the court is not deprived of
its usual power, in appropriate cases, to require that the interrogating
party reimburse the respondent for the expense of assembling his records
and making them intelligible.
See generally 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 33.20, at 33-103 to 33-105 (2d ed. 1975).
75 See Advisory Committee Note to rule 33, note 74 supra. See also Daiflon Inc.
v. Allied Chem. Corp., 534 F.2d 221, 223-24 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886
(1976).
7" Advisory Committee Note to rule 34, 48 F.R.D. 526, 526-27 (1970). The
Committee stated that Iplrotection may be afforded to claims of ... undue burden or
expense under what is now Rule 26(c).... To he sure, an appraisal of 'undue' burden
inevitably entails consideration of the needs of the party seeking discovery," Id. See,
e.g., Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
77 Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2c1 636, 650 (2d Cir. 1976). See, e.g., Babcock &
Wilcox Co. v. Public Serv. Co. of Indiana, 22 Fed. R. Serv, 2d 340, 341 (S.D. Ind.
1976); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Inc., 8 F.R.D. 551, 553 (S.D.N.Y.
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cuit's en banc decision in Oppenheimer. The court of appeals in that case held
that the district court had not abused its discretion in requiring the respond-
ing party to shoulder the expense. The court of appeals reasoned that
"Where is no injustice in requiring one whose business is vast and complex to
go to proportionately greater lengths to meet the law's legitimate require-
ments for disclosure of business-related information than might be expected
of one whose business is small and simple." 78
 Since the Supreme Court's
opinion in Oppenheimer only attacked the premise of the court of appeals'
decision—that the information was sought for a purpose placing it within the
scope of discovery—the court of appeals' application of rule 34 is still valid.
Therefore, if plaintiffs in situations where the identity of class members is
stored on computers can characterize their request for the names of the class
members as within the scope of discovery, rule 34 applies and they may suc-
cessfully avoid the expense of discovery.
Since a court can allocate the expense of discovery differently under rule
34 and rule 33, it is important to determine which rule applies to a plaintiff's
request for the names of class members. Where, as in Oppenheimer and in an
increasing number of stockholder suits, the names and addresses of
stockholders are stored in computer files, it is submitted that rule 34 should
govern. Rule 34, unlike rule 33, provides specifically for the discovery of data
stored on computers." It reqUires the responding party to provide the data
in useable form; and, as the Advisory Committee specifically noted, in many
instances the only useable form is a printout of computer data.s"
Even if the plaintiff cannot characterize his request for the identification
of the class members as within the scope of discovery, the plaintiff in a
stockholder class action can avoid the ramifications of Oppenheimer by using a
subclass of plaintiffs to limit the size of the plaintiff class, and thereby de-
crease his identification and notification costs. 81
 Rule 23(c)(4)(B) of the Fed-
1949); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2036, 269 n.32
(1970).
78
 Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 650 (2d Cir. 1976).
79
 For the text of rule 34, see note 27 supra.
8 " Advisory Committee Note on rule 34, 48 F.R.D. 526, 527 (1970). The
Committee stated:,
The inclusive description of "documents" is revised to accord with chang-
ing technology. It makes clear that Rule 34 applies to electronic data com-
pilations from which information can be obtained only with the use of de-
tection devices, and that when the data can as a practical matter be made
usable by the discovering party only through respondent's devices, respon-
dent may he required to use his devices to translate the data into usable
form. In many instances, this means that respondent will have to supply a
print-out of computer data.
81
 Justice Powell in his majority opinion in Eisen IV, recognized this alternative
when he stated:
The record does not reveal whether a smaller class of odd-lot traders could
be defined, and if so, whether petitioner would be willing to pay the cost of
notice to members of such a class. We intimate no view on whether any
such subclass would satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. We do note, how-
ever, that our dismissal is without prejudice to any efforts petitioner may
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eral Rules of Civil Procedure states: "a class may be divided into subclasses
and each subclass treated as a class ...."" A class cannot be divided arbi-
trarily into subclasses, however; g3 a subclass must have interests divergent
from those of the class as a whole. 84 Courts have found divergent interests
within classes of stockholders and have certified subclasses in stockholder
suits." Thus, plaintiffs in stockholder class actions should consider subdivid-
ing their class to avoid the often overwhelming burden of identifying and
notifying members of a large class.
There are, however, at least three problems with using subclasses to
minimize the impact of Oppenheimer on stockholder class actions. The first
problem is that it is unclear whether a subclass can proceed alone in an action
if other members of the class cannot find a representative. This is likely to
occur, for example, in cases like Oppenheimer where a representative for the
subclass of securities purchasers who had subsequently sold their shares would
be forced to incur large expenses identifying the members of that subclass.
make to redefine his class either under Rule 23(c)(4) or Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 15.
417 U.S. at 179 n.16.
82 Rule 23 (c)(4)(B) states "a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly." See 2 H. NEWBURG, CLASS AcrioNs ¶ 2425a, at 87-93 (1977).
83 The plaintiffs in Oppenheimer attempted to redefine the class to include only
the current shareholders. They failed, however, because the district court felt that the
proposed limitation was "an arbitrary reduction in the classes." Sanders v. Levy, 20
Fed. R. Serv: 2d 1218, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court reasoned that shareholders
who had purchased the shares at inflated prices and subsequently sold those shares
were affected "as much as those who happened to have retained their shares." Id. The
Court apparently overlooked a divergence of interest between purchasers who sold
their shares and those that have retained their shares. This divergence of interest
arises from the difference between the damages suffered by purchasers who presum-
ably benefited from the inflated value of the shares because they resold them before
the public knew of the inflation of the Fund's assets, and the damages suffered by
purchasers who retained their shares until after the asset inflation became public and
therefore could not recover their investment. Thus, at least two subclasses could have
been created in Oppenheimer pursuant to rule 23(c)(4)(B).
84 For text of rule 23(c)(4)(B), see note 82, supra. The Rules Advisory Commit-
tee explained that "[w]here a class is found to include subclasses divergent in interest,
the class may be divided correspondingly, and each subclass treated as a class." Rules
Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 106 (1966).
85 See Oscar Gruss & Son v. Geon Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 531, 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (class subdivided into those who purchased during the pendency of a takeover
hid but before the downward revision of the offering price, and those who purchased
during the pendency of the takeover bid but after the downward revision of the offer-
ing price); In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litigation, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1373,
1395-99, (N.D. Okla. 1977) (subclasses allowed where the sale of each subsidiary cor-
poration's securities was a unique activity, allegedly involving specific fraudulent con-
duct by a certain group of defendants that was aimed at a particular group of investors
under varying factual circumstances); Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 30
(S.D. Iowa 1972) (court stated that it would order creation of subclasses if, even
though the conflict appeared minimal, at any time two groups of stockholders were
drawing distinctions among defendants in order to protect the corporations in which
they held stock).
630	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:617
Nevertheless, the language of rule 23(c)(4) which states that a court shall treat
a subclass like a class suggests that a subclass could proceed alone. 8" Also, the
Court's reference in Eisen IV to the plaintiff's option of proceeding in a sub-
class as a method of avoiding large notification costs 97
 suggests that a subclass
could proceed alone despite any difficulty the remaining class members might
have in finding a representative. Moreover, the use of subclasses in stock-
holder class actions accords with the major purpose of rule 23, which was enacted
to allow groups of people to protect rights which they could not protect indi-
vidually," as well as the purpose for which civil liabilities are imposed by the
Securities Acts." It is thus submitted that courts should permit the formation
of subclasses when dealing with large stockholder class actions.
The second problem with the use of subclasses is that the subclass still
must satisfy the prerequisites for maintaining a class action as set forth in rule
23(a)."" In particular, the subclass must still be large enough that joinder of
all members is impractical.`" In large stockholder class actions such as Op-
penheimer, the subclasses usually are large enough, but small stockholder class
actions may not qualify and, thus, plaintiffs cannot use subclasses to avoid the
harsh effects of Oppenheimer.
The third problem with the use of subclasses is that the smaller recovery
that a subclass will obtain may not cover the great expenses of a suit. With a
large class, the damage recovery should be enough to cover the costs of
suit—notification, court costs, and attorney fees. With a smaller class, how-
ever, the damage recovery is smaller and, as is very often the case with indi-
vidual investors, may not be sufficient to cover the costs of a suit.
These three problems suggest that the use of subclasses is only a limited
remedy for mitigating the effects of Oppenheimer on stockholder class actions.
Also, the technique of classifying requests for the identity of class members as
discovery will not always be available to a plaintiff wishing to avoid the ex-
penses of identifying class members. Thus, congressional action will be neces-
sary to effectively mitigate the effects of Oppenheimer.
CONCLUSION
The Oppenheimer Court's decision to require the plaintiff in a stockholder
class action to bear the cost of identifying class members in all but a few
circumstances inevitably will increase the burden of bringing such actions.
The plaintiff in a stockholder class action now must bear not only the cost of
actual notification of class members, but also of their identification. This in-
8 " See note 82 supra for the exact language of the statute. The Advisory
Committee stated: "Two or more classes may be represented in a single action. Where
a class is found to include subclasses divergent in interests, the class may he divided
correspondingly, and each subclass treated as a class." Advisory Committee Note, 39
F.R.D. 69, at 106.
" 417 U.S. at 179 u.16. See note 81 supra.
99 See text at note 65 supra.
" See text at notes 61-63 supra.
"" The prerequisites to maintaining a class action are set forth in note 66 supra.
91 FED. R. CR,. P. 23(a)(1). See note 66 supra.
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crease in expense conflicts with the purposes and policies behind rule 23 and
the Securities Acts. Plaintiffs may be able to avoid the harsh effect of the
Oppenheimer decision by using subclasses of plaintiffs or by classifying their
request for the names of class members as a discovery request. These methods
should prove effective only in certain circumstances, however. Thus, the ulti-
mate revitalization of stockholder class actions will depend on future congres-
sional action.
JAMES R. REPETTI
